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Bastards! . . .. And the Welfare Plantation
Zanita E. Fenton*
I. INTRODUCTION
The legitimacy status of children has been a deterrent for extramarital
liaisons,' has guaranteed the social reputation of the father,2 and has
facilitated intergenerational transfers of wealth.3 Historically, illegitimacy
status has assisted in gender subordination and control over female sexuality
and reproduction; it has made social class standing all but pre-determined at
birth; it has contributed to the maintenance of racial stratification. Indeed,
illegitimate is an appropriate description for the effects of this legally and
socially imposed status upon children.
While there are a variety of ways in which scholars tackle the myriad
legal and social issues that inhere from illegitimacy status,4 scholars have
recently focused on the effects of illegitimacy status on the children of
LGBT couples, including a full symposium on the "new" illegitimacy in
LGBT families.5 From this perspective, one might characterize this Article
* Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law. I thank the student editors of The Journal
of Gender, Race and Justice for bringing together a remarkable group of scholars and for holding an
amazingly well-run symposium. I also thank Chris Ivory, my research assistant, for his intelligence
and dedication in accomplishing research for me.
I. Jenny Teichman, Illegitimacy, 8 J. MED. ETHICS 42, 43 (1982).
2. The regulation may guarantee reputation for the marital father but is far from a guarantee
of biological paternity. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (holding that a father
asserting paternity rights under the marital presumption has a superior claim to the paternity claim of
a non-marital, biological father).
3. See, e.g., Martha F. Davis, Male Coverture: Law and the Illegitimate Family, 56
RUTGERS L. REv. 73, 86-87 (2003); Solangel Maldonado, Illegitimate Harm: Law, Stigma, and
Discrimination Against Nonmarital Children, 63 FLA. L. REV. 345, 357-60 (2011). But see Adrienne
D. Davis, The Private Law of Race and Sex: An Antebellum Perspective, 51 STAN. L. REv. 221,
284-85 (1999) (nothing that in both testate and intestate transfers of wealth, "[clourts construed
enslavement as a defining, dispositive status that governed the assignment of rights, even after
Emancipation.... Marriage and slavery were classified as mutually exclusive legal relationships, as
'fanciful conceit[s]' in the strongest articulation of the marriage-as-contract rule ..... (citation
omitted)).
4. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 3, at 79; Mary Louise Fellows, A Feminist Interpretation of
the Law of Legitimacy, 7 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 195 (1998); Mary Louise Fellows, The Law of
Legitimacy: An Instrument of Procreative Power, 3 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 495 (1992) [hereinafter
Fellows, Procreative Power]; Maldonado, supra note 3, at 345. For an earlier examination, see
HARRY D. KRAUSE, ILLEGITIMACY: LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY 257-67 (1971).
5. See Symposium, The New "Illegitimacy": Revisiting Why Parentage Should Not Depend
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as focused on the "old" illegitimacy, noting the origins of the modem form
in the United States in American slavery. 6 Given the racial imbalance of
children who are in foster care or who are seeking permanent adoption,7 and
the nature of the issues that confront these children, identification of
illegitimacy's origins from this standpoint is instructive.
Part II of this Article discusses the relationship between the social
devices used to maintain slavery and the laws determining illegitimacy
status. Part III discusses illegitimacy's role in regulating sex and its race-
specific counterpart of miscegenation. Part IV makes comparisons to
legislation designed to punish unsanctioned relationships and delineate
means for the care of illegitimate children, to modem-day welfare and its
implications. Specifically, Part IV suggests particular moves in the evolution
from legal slavery contributing to the modem form of welfare. Part V
examines the role of marriage and of the marital presumption of paternity in
creating illegitimacy status as well as reinforcement of stigma associated
with Blackness. Part V goes on to discuss how the current welfare system
imposes burdens on fathers, if so defined, while often creating barriers to
strong relationships for those in poverty, especially men of color. Finally,
Part VI of this Article suggests that any future reform efforts should be
crafted with an awareness of racial history, both in avoiding additional
burdens imposed on communities of color and those in poverty, as well as in
finding realistic solutions to build strong community.
II. RACE AND "THE ODIUM OF ILLEGITIMACY"-A FINANCIAL PENALTY
FOR BLACKNESS
Illegitimacy once was, and perhaps still is, a means of regulating race
through anti-miscegenation law and sentiment. A case in the midst of Jim
Crow segregation, Wolfe v. Georgia Railway,8 demonstrates the variables
on Marriage, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 1 (2012).
6. Illegitimacy was recognized under the common law, taken from English tradition. See I
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *447 (1769). One significant tradition in this regard is
Lord Mansfield's Rule. Lord Mansfield's Rule is an evidentiary one which provides that neither
husband nor wife are entitled to give testimony on the question whether they had access to the other
at the time of conception. See The King v. Luffe, (1807) 103 Eng. Rep. 316 (K.B.). Interestingly,
William Murray, first Earl of Mansfield, helped dismantle slavery and also created the legal rule to
protect the status of children born within a marriage, even if not biologically that of the husband.
Lord Mansfield wrote the opinion in Somerset's Case, finding that slavery was unsustainable in
England. Somerset v. Stewart, (1772) 98 Eng. Rep. 499 (K.B.).
7. CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, FOSTER CARE STATISTICS 2011, at 9 (Jan. 2013),
available at https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/factsheets/foster.pdf (stating that the number of
Black children waiting in foster care is more than twice the representation of Blacks within the
general population, having decreased from a high of 38% in 2001 to 27% in 2011).
8. Wolfe v. Ga. Ry. & Elec. Co., 58 S.E. 899, 902 (Ga. Ct. App. 1907). In Wolfe, the
appearance of balance in consequences is pure advocacy justifying the result; the effects were
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comprising its ongins:
[A] pure black man cannot be mistaken for a white man, and the
fact that intermarriage between the races has been continuously
forbidden in this state, to charge a white man, even though of dark
skin, with being a colored man, or a colored man, even though of
fair skin, with being a white man, is to impute the odium of
illegitimacy.9
For many years, anti-miscegenation legislation prevented interracial
marriage, or relations of any kind.' 0 A child of mixed race was, by
definition, illegitimate. This included any children of a marriage annulled on
grounds of miscegenation.1 1 Further, since Blackness was understood and
defined as any part Black,12 virtually all individuals of even remote, but
known, 13 Black heritage were deemed Black and, concomitantly,
illegitimate. Yet, miscegenation was just one element in making Blackness
synonymous with illegitimacy. No marriage by any slave was legally
enforceable.14 Even those "marriages" that slave owners encouraged to
predictable with the existing social, political and legal landscape. See id.
9. Id. (emphasis added).
10. See generally RANDALL KENNEDY, INTERRACIAL INTIMACIES: SEX, MARRIAGE,
IDENTITY, AND ADOPTION (2003).
I1. Id. at 221-22.
12. See, e.g., WALDO E. MARTIN, JR., THE MIND OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS 205-06 (1984);
Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1709 (1993) (describing the "rules" for
Blackness as based in descent and quantification of blood); Deborah W. Post, Cultural Inversion and
the One-Drop Rule: An Essay on Biology, Racial Classification, and the Rhetoric of Racial
Transcendence, 72 ALB. L. REV. 909, 923 (2009); Daniel J. Sharfstein, Crossing the Color Line:
Racial Migration and the One-Drop Rule, 1600-1860, 91 MINN. L. REV. 592, 631 (2007). See also
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 541 (1896) ("[PJetitioner was seven eighths Caucasian and one
eighth African blood .... ).
13. See, e.g., Mark Golub, Plessy As "Passing": Judicial Responses to Ambiguously Raced
Bodies in Plessy v. Ferguson, 39 LAw & SOC'Y REv. 563 (2005); Randall Kennedy, Racial Passing,
62 OHIO ST. LJ. 1145, 1145 (2001) ("Passing is a deception that enables a person to adopt certain
roles or identities from which he would be barred by prevailing social standards in the absence of his
misleading conduct."); Christian B. Sundquist, Signifying on Passing: (Post) Post-Racialism, (Post)
Post-Modernism, and (Post) Post-Marxism, I COLUM. J. RACE & L. 482 (2012).
14. W.E.B. DuBols, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA 7 (Transaction Publishers 2013)
(1935) ("The proof of this lies clearly written in the slave codes. Slaves .... could not legally marry
nor constitute families; they could not control their children ... ). Even marriage of a slave to a free
person was permissible only by consent of the master.
For example, in Virginia a marriage between a slave and a free Black was not legally
recognized. If the mother was a slave, the child of the marriage became a slave. If the
mother was free, the child was considered illegitimate and subject to being hired out by
the overseer of the poor.
Id. Prohibitions on interracial marriages also limited the applicability of the presumption and the
evidentiary rule. Yet, in a similarly perverse fashion of the modem day welfare system, a free Black
11
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promote stability on the plantation were subject to breakup by sale. 15 "In
most states that permitted bondage[] marriage conferred no legally
enforceable protections upon slaves. It did not keep a slave from bein sold
away from his or her spouse or separated from his or her children."' This
legal and social reality produced leagues of Black children most, if not all, of
whom were mixed1 7 and all of whom were, by definition, illegitimate.
The status of illegitimates and the status of slaves were almost identical
in sanctioned structural lineage. That is, the laws of slavery required that the
status of the child followed that of the mother, not that of the father as for
non-slaves. 18 Similarly, intestacy laws ensured that the status and rights of
non-marital children arose only from the mother. 19 The category of
illegitimacy, in addition to its independent concerns, perhaps also should be
understood as a form of racial classification and a vestige of slavery.20
However, there were two significant differences. First, slave children were
not guaranteed the lineage of their mothers, as mother and child were both
subject to sale:21
father could not recover support from his son's owner, who was entitled to the child's labor and
therefore required to support. Margaret A. Burnham, An Impossible Marriage: Slave Law and
Family Law, 5 LAW & INEQ. 187, 219 (1987). The father "had no just claim whatever on the
administrator for taking care of his own child . . .. " Prince v. Cole, 28 Mo. 486, 487 (Mo. 1859).
15. See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863-1877,
at 82-85 (1988); HERBERT G. GUTMAN, THE BLACK FAMILY IN SLAVERY AND FREEDOM 1750-
1925, at 23 (1976); Jill Elaine Hasday, Federalism and the Family Reconstructed, 45 UCLA L. REV.
1297, 1330-31 n.122 (1998) (reporting that in three southern states between 1864 and 1866
"slaveholders had terminated 32.4% of the 2,888 analyzed slave marriages" by the Freedmen's
Bureau) (citing JOHN W. BLASSINGAME, THE SLAVE COMMUNITY: PLANTATION LIFE IN THE
ANTEBELLUM SOUTH 175-77, 341, 361 tbl. 17 (2d ed. 1979)).
16. KENNEDY, supra note 10, at 166 (citing THOMAS R. R. COBB, AN INQUIRY INTO THE LAW
OF NEGRO SLAVERY IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 246 (1858)). See also Burnham, supra
note 14, at 189 ("[T]he slave family could not be an organic unit of permanently linked,
interdependent persons. In the eyes of the law, each slave stood as an individual unit of property, and
never as a submerged partner in a marriage or family. The most universal life events-marriage,
procreation, childrearing-were manipulated to meet the demands of the commercial enterprise.
Although slaves did marry, procreate, and form families, in some cases even under the compulsion
of the master, they did so without the sanction of southern law.").
17. KENNEDY, supra note 10, at 367-68.
18. See Burnham, supra note 14, at 215 ("In contradistinction to the common law, the
slaveholding states all adopted the civil rule, partus sequitur ventrem-the issue and descendants of
slaves follow the status of the mother.") (citing COBB, supra note 16, at 68; Wilbert E. Moore, Slave
Law and the Social Structure, J. NEGRO HIST. 171, 185-87 (1941)).
19. See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 766 (1977) (rejecting the reasoning in Labine v.
Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971), that found illegitimate children were not "prevented .. . from sharing
in the estates of their fathers").
20. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. See also Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 439
(1968) (holding that the 13th Amendment authorized Congress to prohibit "the badges and incidents
of slavery").
21. "As property, the slave could be seized at any moment and sold to pay off a living owner's
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[J]ust as the slave mother and father had no recognized legal
relations with the child, the slave child could claim nothing from
its parents. The lot of slave children was more damned and
unfortunate than that of illegitimate children, although slave
children were not strictly considered bastards. The slave child
inherited its mother's status but was not assured of its parentage,
whereas the bastard was its mother's child in every sense. 2 2
Second, "where the slave owner's extra-marital sex might carry a social and
financial penalty if the child he fathered were [W]hite, he stood to gain in
every way from the sexual abuse of slave women."23 The financial penalty
even for a White child was not automatic because at common law, an
unmarried biological father had no legal duty to support his child unless he
openly acknowledged and legitimated the child or used adoption to do so.24
A. The Color of Welfare
The "odium of illegitimacy"25 was developed over more than a century
of laws regulating race and sexual engagement, which effectively created a
race-based child welfare system:
To remedy [the imposition upon masters for the maintenance of
"illegitimate" children] laws were passed in 1715 and 1717 to
reduce to the status of a servant for seven years any white man or
white woman who cohabited with any Negro, free or slave. Their
children were made servants for thirty-one years, a black thus
concerned was reduced to slavery for life and the maintenance of
the bastard children of women servants was made incumbent upon
masters. If the father of an illegitimate child could be discovered,
he would have to support his offspring. If not this duty fell upon
the mother who had to discharge it by servitude or otherwise. 26
debts, or be transferred following the owner's death during the settlement of his estate." Burnham,
supra note 14, at 202 (citation omitted).
22. Id. at 218 (citing Brewer v. Harris, 5 Gratt. 285, 303, 305 (Va. 1848)).
23. Burnham, supra note 14, at 216 n.120. "The slaveholder had two principal interests in
promoting slave unions, both of which were tied to the plantation economy. First, he was in the
business of producing crops and of reproducing capital in the form of slaves." Id. at 197.
24. 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 215 (Jon Roland ed., Constitution
Soc'y 1998) (1826), available at http.//www.constitution.org/jk/jk _000.htm. See also State v.
Tieman, 73 P. 375, 376 (Wash. 1903); Glidden v. Nelson, 15 111. App. 297, 300 (111. App. Ct. 1884).
25. Wolfe v. Ga. Ry. & Elec. Co., 58 S.E. 899, 902 (Ga. Ct. App. 1907).
26. Carter G. Woodson, The Beginnings of the Miscegenation of the Whites and Blacks, 3 J.
NEGRO HIST. 335, 341-42 (Oct. 1918) (emphasis added) (citations omitted); see also KENNEDY,
supra note 10, at 59-60 (citing MARTHA HODES, WHITE WOMEN, BLACK MEN: ILLICIT SEX IN THE
13
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A direct connection between statutes of this type and the current child
welfare system may be tenuous, but it is nonetheless fascinating to recognize
the parallels in the pictures painted. There is a disproportional number of
children of color in foster care or waiting for adoption placement;27 poor
single mothers bear the greatest responsibility28 and now the government
requires them to work lest they impose a financial burden for their children
on the plantation master (read: taxpayers).29 Single mothers are generally
stigmatized, but most especially those producing "Black" children; 30 society
stigmatizes and punishes men of color for creating children out of wed-lock
or otherwise;31 the long-term prospects for children in foster situations are
inclusion in the low-wage work-force.32 Though cynical, it is likely that the
next step in the reformation of welfare is to require the apprenticeship of
children receiving benefits. 33
B. On "Account" of Marriage
The intermediate steps between time periods indicate intent. During
Reconstruction when the Federal Government required the States to
recognize the legal marriages of former slaves, States granted Blacks legal
recognition of their unions. This was motivated not so much to acknowledge
NINETEENTH CENTURY SOUTH 29 (1997)); A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. & Greer C. Cosworth,
"Rather Than the Free": Free Blacks in Colonial and Antebellum Virginia, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 17, 54 (1991).
27. CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, supra note 7.
28. DAPHNE LOFQUIST ET. AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HOUSEHOLDS AND FAMILIES: 2010, at
4-5 (2012), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c201Obr-14.pdf (showing that
single female parent households out number single male parent households by three to one).
29. Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) Overview, U.S. DEPARTMENT HEALTH
& HUM. SERVICES, http://www.hhs.gov/recovery/programs/tanf/tanf-overview.html (last visited
Sept. 16, 2013) ("[R]ecipients must work as soon as they are job-ready or no later than two years
after coming on assistance."); see also DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE,
REPRODUCTION, AND THE MEANING OF LIBERTY 210 (1997).
30. LOFQUIST ET AL., supra note 28, at 7.
31. See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE
AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010) (making a powerful case that "Jim Crow" continues to
systematically operate through the criminal justice system).
32. See, e.g., Peter J. Pecora et al., Educational and Employment Outcomes of Adults
Formerly Placed in Foster Care: Results From the Northwest Foster Care Alumni Study, 28 CHILD.
& YOUTH SERV. REV. 1459, 1471-72 (2006) (evaluating "long-term effects of family foster care on
adult functioning using a sample of 659 young adults from two public and one private child welfare
agencies").
33. This suggestion is not so farfetched as it was openly discussed by former Speaker of the
House, Newt Gingrich. See Trip Gabriel, When Gingrich's Big Thoughts Backfire, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
5, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/ 2 01 l/12/06/us/politics/campaign-2012-when-gingrichs-big-
thoughts-backfire.html?_r-0.
14 [ 17:2014]
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their freedom and full citizenship, but more so as a means of regulating
behavior to avoid a drain of the states' economic resources. 34
The financial motives behind granting freed Blacks the right to
marry were most apparent in the government's policies for newly
freed men who were reunited with multiple spouses with multiple
children. In these instances, government agents often selected one
family for these men, basing their decisions on the number of
dependents in each potential nuclear family unit. ... The
government's motive of minimizing states' responsibility for freed
slaves was also reflected in decisions to allow newly freed black
women with children fathered by their former slavemaster to name
a black man as the father in charge of supporting their children.35
Through economic bonuses, the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), 36 provides incentives to states
to implement measures to reduce illegitimacy, that is to say, reduce the
number of non-marital children 37 with the assumption this reduction will
also limit the number of children needing assistance. 38 Recent policy
initiatives under the PROWRA include the Healthy Marriage Initiative,3 9
34. Katherine M. Franke, Becoming a Citizen: Reconstruction Era Regulation of African
American Marriages, II YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 251, 302-03 (1999); Angela Onwuachi-Willig, The
Return of the Ring: Welfare Reform 's Marriage Cure as the Revival of Post-Bellum Control, 93
CALIF. L. REV. 1647, 1657 (2005) (citing Dorothy E. Roberts, Welfare and the Problem of Black
Citizenship, 105 YALE L.J. 1563, 1569-70 (1996)).
35. Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 34, at 1660 (citing LEON F. LITWACK, BEEN IN THE STORM
So LONG: THE AFTERMATH OF SLAVERY 233-34 (1979)); See also Maldonado, supra note 3, at 382.
Differential laws and treatment have had an enduring effect on Black family life. See, e.g., ANDREW
BILLINGSLEA, BLACK FAMILIES IN WHITE AMERICA (1968); W.E.B. DuBols, THE NEGRO
AMERICAN FAMILY (1970); E. FRANKLIN FRAZIER, THE NEGRO FAMILY IN THE UNITED STATES
(1939); JACQUELINE JONES, LABOR OF LOVE, LABOR OF SORROW: BLACK WOMEN, WORK, AND THE
FAMILY, FROM SLAVERY TO THE PRESENT (1985); JOYCE LADNER, TOMORROW'S TOMORROW: THE
BLACK WOMAN (1971); CAROL STACK, ALL OUR KIN: STRATEGIES FOR SURVIVAL IN A BLACK
COMMUNITY (1975); CHARLES VERT WILLIE, THE FAMILY LIFE OF BLACK PEOPLE (1970).
36. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.);
PRWORA created the Temporary Aid to Needy Families (TANF) to provide each state with a block
grant. Temporary Assistance to Needy Families, U.S. DEPARTMENT HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES,
http://www.hhs.gov/recovery/programs/tanf (last visited Sept. 16, 2013).
37. Prior policy initiatives have included sterilization efforts and incentives to reduce
"illegitimacy." The state subsidizes childbirth and sterilization, but not medically safe abortions-it
seems that there is a "tax" for choosing abortion. Susan Frelich Appleton, Illegitimacy and Sex, Old
And New, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POLY & L. 347, 379 (2012). Perhaps akin to this concept is the
idea that child support is a "tax" on heterosexual intercourse. See id. at 365.
38. See 42 U.S.C. § 603(a)(2) (2006) (promoting responsible fatherhood and marriage to
provide for families).
39. See Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, 120 Stat. 4 (codified in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.); see also Healthy Marriage Initiative (HMI), U.S. DEPARTMENT HEALTH &
15
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targeted especially at minority communities. 40
C. Inheriting Stigma
Focusing primarily on its use as an impediment to inter-generational
transfers of wealth, the Supreme Court in 1968 acknowledged that
stigmatizing a child is an inappropriate means for deterring adult behavior.4 1
It applied intermediate scrutiny to illegitimacy classifications, though
leaving the door open for some continuing permissible distinctions,42
including those based on the gender of the parent.43 While gender
distinctions note that mothers and fathers are not similarly situated in the
birth of a non-marital child, it does not consider that illegitimacy is itself a
distinction founded in gender roles and distinctions.
Comparatively, the use of illegitimacy as a form of racial discrimination
has not been discussed by the courts,44 not even in Nguyen v. INS, which
involved the citizenship status of a foreign born, mixed-race, non-marital
child.45 In Nguyen, the non-marital, foreign-born child of a United States
citizen father had to be legitimated before the age of eighteen in order to
acquire United States citizenship. 46 In addition to implicating gender and
HUM. SERVICES, http://archive.acf.hhs.gov/healthymarriage/about/mission.html#footnote I (last
visited Sept. 16, 2013).
40. Hispanic-Targeted Healthy Marriage Programs, U.S. DEPARTMENT HEALTH & HUM.
SERVICES, http://archive.acf.hhs.gov/healthymarriage/pdf/June20 aa hispanictargetedprograms.PDF
(last visited, Sept. 16, 2013); African American Targeted-Programs, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUM.
SERVs., //archive.acf.hhs.gov/healthymariage/pdf/June20 aa targetedprograms.PDF (last visited
Sept. 16, 2013).
41. Four years later, the Court further noted in Weber v. Aetna, that placing condemnation of
the parents' "irresponsible liaisons . . . on the head of an infant is illogical and unjust." Weber v.
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972). See also Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 70
(1968) (applying Equal Protection to classifications based on legitimacy).
42. See Weber, 406 U.S. at 175. But see Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 265 (1978) (holding
classifications based on illegitimacy are invalid "if they are not substantially related to permissible
state interests"); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 767 (1977) (requiring scrutiny less than "strict"
for classifications based on illegitimacy); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 506 (1976) (requiring
less than strict scrutiny for illegitimacy).
43. See Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001) (citizenship status automatic for U.S. citizen
mother, but not father); Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 (1979) (wrongful death suit allowed for
mother, but not father).
44. Ironically, at least two of the early illegitimacy cases decided by the Supreme Court in the
late 1960s and early 1970s analyzing Equal Protection involved African-American children, even if
race was not explicitly identified in the opinions. See Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532, 549 (1971)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (the race of the plaintiff children is implied by reference); Levy v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968). But cf HARRY D. KRAUSE, ILLEGITIMACY: LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY
257-67 (1971) (specifically identifying poverty and race related issues in illegitimacy).
45. Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001).
46. Id. at 59; 8 U.S.C. § 1409 (2006).
16 [ 17:2014]
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illegitimacy status,4 7 Nguyen implicates racial status and caste. In the
previous history of citizenship cases, the court adjudicated whether the
applicant was White in order to accord citizenship, 48 even denying
citizenship to mixed-race children.49  Ignoring these implications in
citizenship cases or otherwise is tantamount to a continuation of antebellum
law and society.5 0
111. WHITE MOTHERS OF BLACK CHILDREN
Since illegitimacy is dependent upon the marital status of the child's
mother at the time of the child's birth, marriage served as a means for state
enforced "birth control." 5  Thus, in addition to the maintenance of White
supremacy and wealth maintenance, 52 illegitimacy served as a device for the
maintenance of patriarchy, furthering the sexual control over women. 53 She
need only be married, but not necessarily to the biological father. This is due
to the anachronistic marital presumption of paternity laws that currently
extends further by way of modem-day statutes assigning parentage to a
47. See, e.g., Lica Tomizuka, The Supreme Court's Blind Pursuit of Outdated Definitions of
Familial Relationships in Upholding the Constitutionality of 8 U.S.C. § 1409 in Nguyen v. Ins, 20
LAW & INEQ. 275 (2002); Laura Weinrib, Protecting Sex: Sexual Disincentives and Sex-Based
Discrimination in Nguyen v. Ins, 12 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 222 (2003).
48. See, e.g., United States v. Bhagat Singh Thind, 261 U.S. 204, 213-15 (1923) (holding that
an East Indian was not considered White for purposes of immigration because White is to be
interpreted in accordance with the understanding of the common person); Takao Ozawa v. United
States, 260 U.S. 178, 198 (1922) (holding that Japanese are not White); In re Easurk Emsen Charr,
273 F. 207, 213-14 (W.D. Mo. 1921) (holding that Koreans are not White); In re Rallos, 241 F. 686,
686 (E.D.N.Y. 1917) (holding that Filipinos are not White); In re Buntaro Kumagai, 163 F. 922, 924
(W.D. Wash. 1908) (holding that Japanese are not White); In re Yamashita, 70 P. 482, 483 (Wash.
1902) (holding that Japanese are not White); In re Saito, 62 F. 126, 127-28 (C.C.D. Mass. 1894)
(holding that Japanese are not White); In re Kanaka Nian, 21 Pac. 993, 993-94 (Utah 1889) (finding
that Native Hawaiians are not White); In re Ah Yup, I F. Cas. 223, 225 (C.C.D. Cal. 1878) (holding
that Chinese are not White).
49. See, e.g., In re Cruz, 23 F. Supp. 774, 775 (E.D.N.Y. 1938) (denying a mixed Native and
African American petitioner naturalization).
50. See supra text accompanying notes 10-17.
51. Teichman, supra note 1, at 42 ("It would not be altogether paradoxical to say that the
fundamental form of birth control is marriage and marriage law, since it is marriage which
determines who shall reproduce the species and when.").
52. Inheritance is primarily based on recognized forms of legal paternity, which includes
succession to children born of a marriage (marital presumption); public acknowledgement of
paternity in writing; waiver by contract, typically of the husband; legal adoption; in an invitro-
fertilization procedure; or through legal paternity proceedings prior to the death of the testate. Davis,
supra note 3, at 86-87. See Maldonado, supra note 3, at 357-60 (demonstrating that inheritance
continues to be based substantially in the marital status of the parents).
53. See generally Appleton, supra note 37; Fellows, Procreative Power, supra note 4.
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consenting married father in the case of artificial donor insemination. 54
A. Momma's Baby
Early on, aside from resorting to the marital presumption,55 paternity
was determined by voluntary public acknowledgment by a non-marital
father. 56 Prior to reliable blood test or DNA evidence, occasionally physical
comparison between putative father and child along with circumstantial
evidence of untimely consummation were sufficient to disprove paternity. 57
This evidence was used not only to prove adultery but also, in some
instances, as strong proof of miscegenation. 58 Professor Mary Louise
Fellows reminds us that:
If a child who had African-American features was born to a
woman who was believed to be of the white race and whose
husband was also believed to be of the white race, the nineteenth-
century courts refused to apply the marital presumption. The courts
held that that the presumption could be rebutted by 'evidence
which clearly and conclusively shows that the procreation by the
husband was impossible; and that, . . . according to the course of
nature, the husband could not be the father of the child .... ' 59
Rather than imagine that a White man could have Black heritage,60 the
54. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 703 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 356 (2001 & Supp 2004).
55. See infra text accompanying notes 82-90.
56. See Maldonado, supra note 3, at 357.
57. See Watkins v. Carlton, 37 Va. 560, 564 (Va. 1840) (citation omitted) ("Proof of
impotency of the husband, or of nonaccess to the wife, were sufficient to bastardize the issue,
because such facts shewed the natural impossibility that the husband should be the father; and any
other matter which proved the same impossibility, was equally sufficient to bastardize the issue.").
58. In Watkins, the court stated that if "cases of the husband being beyond sea, imprisoned,
impotent, and the like, are but instances of the application of the rule. Even nonaccess, if proved,
though the parties are in the same kingdom, will suffice. How, then, if the impossibility rests upon
the laws of nature itself? Shall it be less regarded? Shall the white child of a white couple be
bastardized, upon questionable proof that the husband was rendered impotent by disease; and shall
we legitimate a negro because he was born in wedlock?" Id. at 575. See also Fellows, Procreative
Power, supra note 4, at 502 ("Thus, judicial error was tolerated when it meant that a white child,
unrelated by blood, would be made a white man's legal heir. An African-American child becoming a
white man's legal heir, however, was unacceptable. Faced with this situation, the [Watkins] court
essentially suspended application of the presumption."); see also infra notes 67-70 and
accompanying text.
59. See Fellows, Procreative Power, supra note 4, at 500 n. 18 (citing Bullock v. Knox, II So.
339, 340 (Ala. 1891)). See also supra note 57 (discussing non-proof of paternity).
60. See sources cited supra note 13 (discussing "passing," where White-appearing African-
Americans "pass" as White for its social privilege and indicating that, because of the prevalence of
"passing," someone may believe his heritage to be "pure" Caucasian even if it is not so).
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"blame" was placed on the wife and mother for her presumed infidelity.61
Thus, the marital presumption of paternity was an effective means of gender
subordination as well as a means of ensuring White supremacy.
White wives and children were once understood to be the property of
the husband and putative father;62 coverture, an anachronistic marital form,
supported this notion. Under coverture, the husband took responsibility for
his wife's debts, making any child of hers a debt for which the husband was
responsible. 63 This is somehow an additional justification for the marital
presumption of paternity.64 Though adultery was generally not condoned,
legal rules made it difficult to prove.65 However, it was considered
especially egregious for a White woman to commit adultery with a Negro. 66
Interracial adultery rendered White women "'infamous and bankrupt in
reputation, and unworthy of associating with the decent and respectable of
61. See infra note 68.
62. See Burnham, supra note 14, at 215-16. The treatment of women under rape law (or lack
thereof) was an indication of their status as property. See, e.g., JOSHUA D. ROTHMAN, NOTORIOUS IN
THE NEIGHBORHOOD: SEX AND FAMILIES ACROSS THE COLOR LINE IN VIRGINIA, 1787-1861, at
133-63 (2003); Burnham, supra note 14, at 199 (discussing racist and misogynistic justifications for
rape); Cheryl Harris, Finding Soujourner's Truth: Race Gender, and the Institution of Property, 18
CARDOZO L. REV. 309, 332 (1996) (noting if slave marriages were recognized it would give Black
men property rights to their wives and children); KENNEDY, supra note 10 at 162-82; Jennifer B.
Wriggins, Rape, Racism, and the Law, 6 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 103, 117-23 (1983). Marital
coverture continues in subtle forms like anti-nepotism rules, women's status after dissolution of
marriage, and husband's surname. Davis, supra note 3, at 79.
63. See Dianne Avery & Alfred S. Konefsky, The Daughters of Job: Property Rights and
Women's Lives in Mid-Nineteenth-Century Massachusetts, 10 LAW & HIST. REv. 323, 336-37
(1992). One of the burdens of marriage undertaken by men that was frequently mentioned was that
upon marriage he became responsible for paying all of his wife's debts. Id The responsibility of a
wife's debt was a burden that made up for the benefit that a husband gained by having access to her
wealth. Id. The debt burden, however, apparently was illusory. Id. Historical evidence suggests that
women avoided debt and usually did not marry holding any debt. Id. at 343. See also SUSAN
LEBSOCK, THE FREE WOMEN OF PETERSBURG: STATUS AND CULTURE IN A SOUTHERN TOWN, 1784-
1860, at 126-27 (1984).
64. See Avery & Konefsky, supra note 63, at 336.
65. Generally speaking, unless a third person were present or otherwise witnessed the act and
could provide testimony to that effect, proof for adultery could only be circumstantial, requiring
evidence of opportunity and inclination. See William E. Nelson, Patriarchy or Equality: Family
Values or Individuality, 70 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 435, 446-47 (1997). As courts were once inclined to
find in favor of a continuing marriage, this proof had to be quite strong for the ground to be
effective. See id; see also LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 142-45
(2005).
66. ROTHMAN, supra note 62, at 455; PETER BARDAGLIO, RECONSTRUCTING THE
HOUSEHOLD: FAMILIES, SEX, AND THE LAW IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY SOUTH 48-64 (1995);
see generally Karen A. Getman, Sexual Control in the Slaveholding South: The Implementation and
Maintenance of a Racial Caste System, 7 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 115, 122-42 (1984); A. Leon
Higginbotham, Jr., & Barbara K. Kopytoff, Racial Purity and Interracial Sex in the Law of Colonial
and Antebellum Virginia, 77 GEO. L.J. 1967, 1998-2000 (1989).
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the community . . ."'67 A White woman who gave birth to a Black child
showed clear evidence of the offense.68 Indeed, being the mother of a Black
child was enough to indicate poor moral character. Thus, indicating that
the strongest litmus for illegitimacy was Blackness. 70 This is still the case, in
that "a single white woman giving birth to a bi-racial child may ...
[encounter] some social stigma . . . . [T]he stigma of out-of-wedlock birth
and the financial difficulties many single mothers face may combine with
these other factors to persuade some [W]hite birth mothers to surrender their
bi-racial children for adoption."71 Notwithstanding its impetus, this choice is
perhaps better than infanticide or abortion, recourse once common for White
mothers of Black children.72
67. Joshua D. Rothman, "To Be Freed from Thate Curs and Let at Liberty": Interracial
Adultery and Divorce in Antebellum Virginia, 106 THE VA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 443, 443
(1998) (quoting Petition of Thomas Culpepper, No. 10943, Legislative Petitions, Records of the
General Assembly, Record Group 78, Archives Division, Library of Virginia, Richmond (Norfolk
County, Va. Dec. 9, 1835)). See also Higginbotham & Kopytoff, supra note 66, at 1998-2000
(exploring Watkins v. Carlton, 37 Va. 560 (Va. 1840), and genealogical possibilities).
68. The assumption does not account for the possibility of Negro heritage in the background
of either or both parties to the marriage. See ROTHMAN, supra note 62, at 455-57, 459.
69. ROTHMAN, supra note 62, at 452 (citing Petition of Thomas Cain, No. 13097, Archives
Division, Library of Virginia, Richmond (Frederick County, Va. Jan. 9, 1841)).
70. ANDERS WALKER, THE GHOST OF JIM CROW: How SOUTHERN MODERATES USED
BROWN V BOARD OF EDUCATION TO STALL CIVIL RIGHTS 3-9, 41, 70, 79-81 (2009) (arguing that
race became a proxy for immorality). See also DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY:
RACE, REPRODUCTION, AND THE MEANING OF LIBERTY 8 (1998) ("[1]t is believed that Black
mothers transfer a deviant lifestyle to their children that dooms each succeeding generation to a life
of poverty, delinquency, and despair. A persistent objective of American social policy has been to
monitor and restrain this corrupting tendency of Black motherhood.").
71. Twila L. Perry, Transracial and International Adoption: Mothers, Hierarchy, Race, and
Feminist Legal Theory, 10 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 101, 137-38 (1998) (suggesting that this dynamic
enables the transfer of children from the least advantaged women to the most advantaged, doing
nothing to change the conditions that make child care impossible for some women). See also
Appleton, supra note 37, at 352 (citing ANN FESSLER, THE GIRLS WHO WENT AWAY: THE HIDDEN
HISTORY OF WOMEN WHO SURRENDERED CHILDREN FOR ADOPTION IN THE DECADES BEFORE ROE
V. WADE (2006); ELAINE TYLER MAY, BARREN IN THE PROMISED LAND: CHILDLESS AMERICANS
AND THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS 127-49 (1995)). See also Teichman, supra note 1, at 43 ("Marriage
law controls birth for the purpose of organizing human society into families, kin-groups, lineages
and nations . . . . Since these matters are of very profound importance it is not hard to understand
why traditionally a child born outside the rules carried a heavy stigma or was even, in some places,
actually put to death.").
72. See KENNEDY, supra note 10, at 367 (citing HARRIET A. JACOBS, INCIDENTS IN THE LIFE
OF A SLAVE GIRL, WRITTEN BY HERSELF (Jean Fagan Yellin ed., 1987) (1861)). Technically, the
child of a White mother is at least bi-racial, but it is still part of our common history and social
categories to identify the child as Black. See supra notes 12 and 13.
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B. A "Different" Single Mom
The modem world has seen the advent of a new group attempting to
counteract the stereotypes of immorality, poverty and race that pervade
single-motherhood status: Single Mothers by Choice. 73  The last two
decades have seen the percentages of out-of-wedlock births "[a]mong white
women and women who attended college, more than double[] during the
1980s; for women with professional or managerial jobs, it nearly tripled."7 4
As the group attempts to counter stereotypes, members acknowledge "that
by bearing children out of wedlock, or even adopting on their own, they
would "inherit the stigma of their poorer younger sisters," 75 not to mention
browner. 76 This is not to say that Black and Brown women, professional and
otherwise, do not choose to become single mothers, just that this association
is part of the stigma.
IV. AN OFFSPRING OF THE MARITAL PRESUMPTION OF PATERNITY:
ILLEGITIMACY
Illegitimacy is the offspring of the marital presumption. That is, they
are related and generally work together to accomplish the same social
purposes. Similar to illegitimacy, the origins of the martial presumption
served not only to predetermine intergenerational transfers of wealth, and
ensure sexual control over women, but also to continue racial purity through
the mythology of White supremacy. 78 Fellows demonstrates that the social
imperatives have not changed as "the marital presumption, the evidentiary
rule, and the UPA (Uniform Parentage Act) all transfer procreative power to
white men while simultaneously minimizing and denying the procreative
power of African-American women and, in different ways, of [W]hite
women." 79
73. Single Mothers by Choice is a national organization that provides support and information
to single women considering single motherhood who have already chosen to become single mothers.
The majority of its members are professional women in their thirties and forties. See About, SINGLE
MOTHERS BY CHOICE, http:/ www.singlemothersbychoice.org/about (last visited Sept. 16, 2013).
See also Jane D. Bock, Doing the Right Thing?: Single Mothers by Choice and the Struggle for
Legitimacy, 14 GENDER & Soc'Y 62, 63 (2000).
74. Bock, supra note 73, at 63. See generally Valerie S. Mannis, Single Mothers by Choice,
48 FAM. REL. 121 (1999) (noting that women sometimes choose to parent alone).
75. Bock, supra note 73, at 63.
76. See supra note 28.
77. See Teichman, supra note 1.
78. See supra note 3. Science has long since refuted a biological basis for the social
construction of race. See, e.g., STEPHEN JAY GOULD, THE MISMEASURE OF MAN (1981).
79. Fellows, Procreative Power, supra note 4, at 496.
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A. Legitimately White-Gender Determines Race
The marital presumption concludes that the husband of a married
woman is also the father of any child to whom she gives birth. Its origins
likely date back to Lord Mansfield,o if not before, and continues in some
form in every state. 81 With a similar result, children adopted by a married
couple are then deemed legitimate and may avoid the stigma of the
circumstances of their birth, assuming the adoptee appears to be of the
same race.83 For multi-race families, it is not unusual for non-family
members to believe a bi-racial or Black child has been adopted, even if this
is not true.84 Indeed, it is likely that the practice of secrecy in adoption
records stemmed from, at least partially, an attempt to avoid speculation
about the racial background of an adopted child and to ensure the reputation
of the adopting family. 85 However, Black children born outside marriage are
80. See supra note 6 (discussing Lord Mansfield's rule, and evidentiary rule supporting the
marital presumption of paternity).
8 1. See Susan Frelich Appleton, Presuming Women: Revisiting the Presumption of
Legitimacy in the Same-Sex Couples Era, 86 B.U. L. REV. 227, 228, 233-34 (2006) [hereinafter
Appleton, Presuming Women]. See generally Leslie Joan Harris, Voluntary Acknowledgements of
Parentage for Same-Sex Couples, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER Soc. POL'Y & L. 467 (2012) (discussing
presumption).
82. White unmarried mothers could use maternity homes and adoption agencies that were
unavailable to African Americans. See Burnham, supra note 14, at 207-08 (citing WALKER, supra
note 70, at 79-81).
83. One of the purposes of adoption agencies was to hide or deny the fact of adoption.
Barbara Melosh, Adoption Stories: Autobiographical Narrative and the Politics of Identity, in
ADOPTION IN AMERICA: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES 218, 219 (E. Wayne Carp ed., 2002) ("Concern
for matching-placing children with adoptive parents who were similar in appearance, temperament,
and intelligence-also attests to the interest in effacing the difference of adoption, of making the
adoptive family indistinguishable from the biological family."); Naomi Cahn & Jana Singer,
Adoption, Identity, and the Constitution: The Case for Opening Closed Records, 2 U. PA. J. CONST.
L. 150 (1999). Thus, the doctrine of matching was created. Id. Hair color, eye color and even class
were considered in matching parents to child. "The idea was that parents and child could establish a
better relationship if differences were minimized." Jacqueline Macaulay & Stewart Macaulay,
Adoption for Black Children: A Case Study of Expert Discretion, I RES. L. & Soc. 267, 280 (1978).
The extension of matching policy into ethnicity and race was expectable. Race was the criterion
most strictly followed. See JOYCE A. LADNER, MIXED FAMILIES: ADOPTING ACROSS RACIAL
BOUNDARIES 58 (1977); Ruth-Arlene W. Howe, Adoption Practice, Issues, and Laws 1958-1983, 17
FAM. L.Q. 173, 178 (1983). This is not unlike modern in-vitro fertilization possibilities where
matching of physical characteristics, most especially, are adhered by social convention. See, e.g.,
Susannah Baruch, Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis and Parental Preferences: Beyond Deadly
Disease, 8 Hous. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 245 (2008); Sonia M. Suter, A Brave New World of
Designer Babies?, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 897, 966 (2007).
84. See generally supra notes 10-14 and accompanying text.
85. For example, in Jones v. Gill, 66 P.2d 1033, 1033 (Kan. 1937), the spreading of rumors
that an adopted child was a "half-breed" born to a White father and Negro mother was found to have
caused "humiliation, injury, and damage" and to be slanderous. One has to wonder if the social
taboos against miscegenation are not the underlying reasons for the history of secrecy in adoption
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usually raised by their mother or by other family members, and are counted
as part of the illegitimacy rates for this segment of the population.86
The presumption of legitimacy that inheres from the marriage of a
child's parents, allows these children to automatically receive benefits, not
readily available to non-martial children, including rights of inheritance,
wrongful death damages for the death of the father, child support, United
States citizenship,87 and many other government benefits.8 8 In addition,
efforts to protect adopted children from the stigma of illegitimacy by sealing
their birth records, continues the general stigma associated with birth status,
both for these children and for those never adopted or "legitimized."89 Since
it is more likely that children of divorce will receive child support than
children of never-married parents, it is correspondingly less likely that
African-American and Latino children, as well as foreign-born children of
United States soldiers,90 who are often mixed race and denied citizenship
through their fathers,91 will not receive support.
proceedings. Support for this proposition is sparse, but nonetheless warrants examination. In the
least, the historical use of adoption and welfare for the benefit of Black children and families is not
parallel to that of White families. See Zanita E. Fenton, In a World Not Their Own: The Adoption of
Black Children, 10 HARV. BLACKLETTER J. 39, 42-44, 53-54 (1993). See also Burnham, supra note
14, at 207-08.
86. See Burnham, supra note 14, at 207-08 (citing WALKER, supra note 70, at 78); See also
RICKIE SOLINGER, WAKE UP LITrLE SUSIE: SINGLE PREGNANCY AND RACE BEFORE ROE V. WADE
(1992) (discussing racial differences in the treatment of "out-of wedlock" pregnancy).
87. See, e.g., Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420 (1998) (upholding the validity of laws
governing United States citizenship for children born out of wedlock and outside the United States to
a citizen parent); Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001) (determining that, in the same law addressed in
Miller, more restrictive requirements for children born to a citizen father are acceptable). But see
Laura Weinrib, Protecting Sex: Sexual Disincentives and Sex-Based Discrimination in Nguyen v.
INS, 12 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 222, 255 (2003) (arguing that Nguyen should have argued that the
immigration law impermissibly discriminated on the basis of birth status); Nikki Ahrenholz,
Comment, Miller v. Albright: Continuing to Discriminate on the Basis of Gender and Illegitimacy,
76 DENV. U. L. REV. 281, 281 (1998) (arguing that the Court in Nguyen ignored the discriminatory
effect on foreign-born, non-marital children).
88. Maldonado, supra note 3, at 364. See also Harry D. Krause, Bringing the Bastard into the
Great Society-A Proposed Unform Act on Legitimacy, 44 TEX. L. REv. 829, 829-30 (1966) (noting
that legal distinctions deny illegitimate children "those private resources that ought to be available to
give [them] an even start in life").
89. See sources cited supra note 24.
90. Maldonado, supra note 3, at 366.
91. The non-marital, foreign-born child of a United States citizen father must be legitimated
before the age of eighteen in order to acquire United States citizenship. 8 U.S.C. §1409(a)(2-4)
(2006). Aside from implicating gender, see supra note 36, the history of citizenship cases requiring
the applicant be adjudged White, even to the preclusion of mixed-race children, denial of citizenship
status of the mixed race, foreign born children of United States soldiers and other male United States
citizens also implicates racial status and caste. See, e.g., In re Cruz, 23 F. Supp. 774, 775 (E.D.N.Y.
1938).
23
The Journal of Gender, Race & Justice
B. Proving Grounds
The advent of accurate blood tests for paternity92 and the later use of
DNA tests 93 shifted the focus of paternity to the child rather than on the
status and reputation of the father. This advancement greatly reduced the
stigma experienced by non-marital children. Unfortunately, these tools have
also served to impose impossible financial burdens and stigma on poor
fathers who are disproportionately men of color.94 The pressure on
unmarried mothers to identify fathers is one means of stigmatizing these
fathers. Furthermore, many of the means employed for child support
enforcement presents barriers to the formation of strong child-father bonds,
and consequently, for community stability.
To avoid distinctions between marital and non-marital children, some
scholars have argued for the elimination of the marital presumption by
requiring all children to have paternity testing.95 Where the intention may be
to reduce and eventually eliminate the continued stigma and consequences
for children bom out of wedlock, the presumption was never consistently
used for the benefit of Black children, born to either White families or Black
families,96 and may actually increase the consequences borne by some
children. First, required testing may bring a surprise to an otherwise stable
marriage and prompt conflict, the consequences of which may be felt by the
child. This may include the breakup of that marriage with blame potentially
placed on the child, 97 non-support by an otherwise willing parent, and
92. In the 1940s, courts accepted the evidentiary value of blood group testing. See E. Donald
Shapiro et al., The DNA Paternity Test: Legislating the Future Paternity Action, 7 J.L. & HEALTH 1,
1,19-24 (1992).
93. See id. at 29 ("When combined with other genetic marking tests, such as standard blood
grouping tests and HLA tests, the Probability of Paternity can be raised to a Paternity Index of over a
hundred million to one, or above 99.999999 percent."). Because restriction fragment length
polymorphism (RFLP) requires a large blood sample and a lengthy time for testing, polymerase
chain reaction (PCR) DNA testing has become the standard process for DNA paternity tests. See id
at 36. PCR often results in exclusion rates higher than 99.99% with a small sample and in a quick
timeframe. See id. at 37-38, 47.
94. See supra text accompanying notes 55-72.
95. See Jana Singer, Marriage, Biology, and Paternity: The Case for Revitalizing the Marital
Presumption, 65 MD. L. REv. 246, 265-70 (2006); June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Which Ties Bind?
Redefining the Parent-Child Relationship in an Age of Genetic Certainty, II WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 1011, 1066-70 (2003) (advocating for paternity testing for all children); Nancy E. Dowd,
Parentage at Birth: Birthfathers and Social Fatherhood, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 909, 926,
929 (2006). But see Theresa Glennon, Somebody's Child: Evaluating the Erosion of the Marital
Presumption of Paternity, 102 W. VA. L. REV. 547, 558-59 (2000).
96. See Fellows, Procreative Power, supra note 4, at 498-509.
97. Paternity testing may potentially serve as a trigger for marital violence and child
abuse. See Laura Crites & Donna Coker, What Therapists See That Judges May Miss: A Unique
Guide to Custody Decisions When Spouse Abuse is Charged, 27 JUDGES J. 9, 11 (1988) ("[H]e often
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exclusion from inheritance rights.98 Second, required testing creates a DNA
database, which would be accessible by the state for other purposes. 99 For a
population already disproortionally affected by foster care and by the
prison industrial complex,' 0 this is not a welcome suggestion.
V. ".. . THE FATHER OF A SLAVE IS UNKNOWN TO OUR LAW"l01
The most obvious connection between race and illegitimacy is the
understanding that slaves were not recognized as fathers under the law. This
was, and still is, the baseline for understanding the social stigma associated
with race,102 and the presumed condition accorded it as well as the class-
based reality of inherited wealth once generally denied to even the
acknowledged Black children of White fathers.
A. Rearing Good Slaves
"[T]he nature of the parenting relationship wholly depended upon the
grace of another, in whose hands the child's future actually lay." 03 Indeed,
in the eyes of the law, rearing good slaves was more important than good
threatens to take the children away if she tries to leave . . . . His threats to kill her or her family if she
leaves him are very real."); see also Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women:
Redefining The Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1991). It is not uncommon for abusers to do
things to harm children, even their own, as a means of continuing control over their wives or
girlfriends.
Because the underlying cause for violence is emotional insecurity, low self-esteem,
and a history of abusive behavior from childhood, the batterer will turn the aggression
on the children when the victim is removed from the batterer's control. The batterer
may use the children to communicate threats to the victim, physically or emotionally
abuse the children, or even resort to kidnapping the children.
Michael J. Voris, Civil Orders of Protection: Do They Protect Children, the Tag-along Victims of
Domestic Violence?, 17 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 599, 606 (1991). See also SARAH M. BUEL, THE IMPACT
OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON CHILDREN: RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE INTERVENTIONS (2001);
Shannan Catalano, Intimate Partner Violence in the United States, BUREAU JUST. STAT. 17,
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdflipvus.pdf (last updated Dec. 19, 2007).
98. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 601 cmt. (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 338 (2001 & Supp
2004).
99. Given the recent Supreme Court decision Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013),
determining that DNA evidence was a legitimate part of police booking procedures not unlike
fingerprinting and photographing and reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, the possibility of
evidence collected for civil purposes in a criminal context is no longer remote.
100. See generally supra note 31.
101. Burnham, supra note 14, at 203 (citing Frazier v. Spear, 5 Ky. (2 Bibb) 385, 386 (Ky.
1811)).
102. See supra text accompanying notes 8-33.
103. Burnham, supra note 14, at 205.
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childrearing. 104 "Although the system discouraged parents from forming
strong bonds, the slave mother was nevertheless constantly accused of
neglecting her children, and the father of brutality." 0 5 Even understanding
that the law cannot prevent parent-child bonds and relationships, it
nonetheless creates the conditions under which they exist. For most of the
history of welfare, policy was designed to penalize marriage of welfare
recipients1 06  and to treat minority recipients of transfer payments
differentially.1 07 However, the most consistent welfare policy objective,
throughout, is "making fathers pay." 0 8
Blackness carries with it the presumption of illegitimacy. This means,
in effect, that Black men are not perceived as fathers. "For decades,
government officials have focused on paternal absence in African-American
families, treating '[flatherlessness ... as a distinctly Black problem,' and
blaming absent fathers for many of the social ills plaguing African-
American communities-poverty, teen pregnancy, high delinquency and
incarceration rates, poor academic performance, and idleness."1 09
In spite of the impediments imposed by a history of slavery and those
104. Id. at 204.
105. Id.
106. See, e.g., Joel F. Handler, Women, Families, Work, And Poverty: A Cloudy Future, 6
UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 375 (1996); David L. Chambers, Fathers, The Welfare System, and the Virtues
and Perils of Child-Support Enforcement, 81 VA. L. REV. 2575 (1995); Lee Anne Fennell,
Interdependence and Choice in Distributive Justice: The Welfare Conundrum, 1994 Wis. L. REV.
235 (1994).
107. Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 548 (1972) (upholding state programs where "a
larger percentage of Negroes and Mexican-Americans in AFDC than in the other programs, and that
the AFDC is funded at 75% whereas the other programs are funded at 95% and 100% of recognized
need"); see also MARTHA F. DAVIS, BRUTAL NEED: LAWYERS AND THE WELFARE RIGHTS
MOVEMENT, 1960-1973, at 234 (1995); Fellows, Procreative Power, supra note 4, at 496.
108. See, e.g., Solangel Maldonado, Deadbeat or Deadbroke: Redefining Child Support for
Poor Fathers, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 991, 994 (2006) [hereinafter Maldonado, Deadbroke] ("Why
are policymakers unaware of the higher rate of paternal involvement amongst low-income,
nonresident African-American fathers? Because, when measuring responsible fatherhood, only
formal child support payments count."); Singer, supra note 95, at 250 ("[E]nforcement of child
support obligations is one of the few antipoverty strategies on which conservatives and liberals
generally agree.").
109. Maldonado, Deadbroke, supra note 108, at 993-94 (citation omitted). Eighteen percent of
U.S. women obtaining abortions are teenagers. Rachel K. Jones & Kathryn Kooistra, Abortion
Incidence and Access to Services in the United States, 2008, 43 PERSP. ON SEXUAL & REPROD.
HEALTH 1, 41-50 (2011); see also Facts on Induced Abortion in the United States, GUTTMACHER
INST. (Oct. 2013), http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/fbinduced abortion.html. "Forty-two percent of
women obtaining abortions have incomes below 100% of the federal poverty level ($10,830 for a
single woman with no children)." Id. Since 1990, at least, Blacks have consistently accounted for
30% of all abortions. Id In 2011, Blacks made up approximately 12.3% of the United States
population. Census Data: Demographic Statistics, INFO PLEASE, http://www.infoplease.com/us/
census/data/demographic.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2013). Blacks still make up for thirty percent of
all abortions today. See Facts on Induced Abortion in the United States, supra.
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imposed by modem society, resulting in the discriminatory policies of a
modem welfare system, Professor Solangel Maldonado points to recent
studies finding "that low-income, never married African-American
nonresident fathers are more involved with their children than are
nonresident fathers of other races."1 1l This is fortunate because without
fathers' involvement, children are more likely to do poorly academically,
socially, and emotionally than children in two-parent homes.111 However,
"[c]hildren with involved nonresident fathers perform better academically
and have higher self-esteem and fewer social and behavioral problems than
children who have little contact with their fathers." 12
There is little question about the overall benefits of involvement of
fathers in the development and socialization of their children or of the
overall detriments without. It is also the case that courts do not award
visitation dependent upon child support payment. It is nonetheless the case
that current child support enforcement efforts and mechanisms discourage or
even make impossible meaningful visitation and relationship development
with nonresident, poor fathers. 113 The make-them-pay focus is both
unrealistic and dramatically misses an opportunity to encourage the
relationships that prove beneficial for child development and ultimately for
society in general.
Even understanding that the law cannot prevent parent-child bonds and
relationships, it nonetheless creates the conditions under which they exist.
"[T]he nature of the parenting relationship wholly depended upon the grace
of another, in whose hands the child's future actually lay."11 4 Indeed, in the
eyes of the law, rearing good slaves was more important than good
110. Maldonado, Deadbroke, supra note 108, at 994 (citations omitted); see also Vivian L.
Godsden et al., Situated Identities of Young, African American Fathers in Low-Income Urban
Settings: Perspectives on Home, Street, and the System, 41 FAM. CT. REv. 381, 387, 395 (2003).
111. Maldonado, Deadbroke, supra note 108, at 997-98 (citations omitted) ("Studies have
found that children who have infrequent contact with their fathers are more likely to experience
academic, social, and emotional problems than children who grow up with two parents. For example,
they are more likely to engage in early sexual activity, abuse drugs, and engage in delinquent
behavior. They also tend to have lower levels of cognitive development and lower self-esteem than
children who share close relationships with their nonresident fathers.").
112. Id. at 998 (citations omitted).
113. See Tonya L. Brito, Fathers Behind Bars: Rethinking Child Support Policy Toward Low-
Income Noncustodial Fathers and Their Families, 15 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 617, 650 (2012)
("Automatic withholding of child support payments from employer payroll accounts for two-thirds
of all child support collections. Child support is also secured from able nonpayers through a range of
alternative mechanisms, such as intercepting federal and state income tax refunds, seizing bank
account balances, restricting or revoking drivers', occupational, and professional licenses, and
placing liens on properties."). Indeed, if Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983), determined that
fatherhood is dependent upon biology and an established relationship, any sanctions impeding the
fulfillment and continuation of that relationship makes this proposition a mockery.
114. Burnham, supra note 14, at 205.
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childrearing.11 5 "Although the system discouraged parents from forming
strong bonds, the slave mother was nevertheless constantly accused of
neglecting her children, and the father of brutality."ll 6 Similarly, for most of
the history of welfare, Congress designed policy to penalize marriage of
welfare recipients 117 and to treat minority recipients of transfer payments
differentially.118 However, the most consistent welfare policy objective,
throughout, is making fathers pay. 1 19
B. Can't Buy a Good Father
While there may be a strong correlation with visitation and child
support payments, making poor fathers pay when their own financial
stability is in question only serves to frustrate and alter any delicate balance
allowing that father to visit his child and contribute in any meaningful
fashion. Maldonado advocates for recognition of "in-kind" ayments in lieu
of hard cash. 120 In-kind is symbolic, visible and durable12l and places the
focus more squarely on the relationship between father and child. 22 Given
the correlation between involvement by fathers in the lives of their children
and successful outcomes, 123 it makes more sense for the state to invest in
promoting these associations over either enforcement of what are essentially
small amounts or dealing with the consequences of poor social outcomes for
a greater number of children.
115. Id. at 204 (citations omitted).
116. Id.
117. Cf Chambers, supra note 106.
118. See supra note 108 and accompanying text; see also DAVIS, supra note 3, at 234; Fellows,
Procreative Power, supra note 4, at 496.
119. See, e.g., Maldonado, Deadbroke, supra note 107, at 994 ("Why are policymakers
unaware of the higher rate of paternal involvement amongst low-income, nonresident African-
American fathers? Because, when measuring responsible fatherhood, only formal child support
payments count."); Singer, supra note 95, at 249-50.
120. Maldonado, Deadbroke, supra note 108, at 995-96 ("Although the majority of poor,
nonresident African-American fathers do not pay child support, many make in-kind and nonfinancial
contributions to their children. Child support enforcement officials have not recognized these
contributions, crediting only formal child support payments. As a result, poor, African-American
fathers are perceived as greater deadbeats and as less involved in their children's upbringing than
other fathers. This failure to recognize informal contributions may drive poor fathers away and make
it more difficult for them to maintain relationships with their children.").
121. Id. at 1005.
122. Id at 1019 ("[C]ustodial mothers and children might benefit if the law credited fathers' in-
kind contributions because deadbroke fathers would have an incentive to make in-kind contributions
and spend more time with their children.").
123. See supra notes 111-112 and accompanying text.
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Unemployment rates for African-American males are still the highest of
any category.124 Placing some of that grant money into target programs for
job creation or for corresponding job training would benefit children with
nonresident fathers more than child support "persecutions." High rates of
incarceration of men of color' 25 make finding employment that much more
difficult and, during incarceration, removes those fathers from the
community and very often from contact with their child. To complete the
trifecta, not only are nonmarital children less likely to receive support for
college, 126- perhaps obvious for children of impoverished parents- this
dynamic also contributes to low levels of college educated African-
Americans.1 2
7
VI. MARRIAGE AND OTHER REGULATED CONTRACTS
Current statistics indicate that marriage rates for African-Americans are
low, 128 but were not always at such levels. In fact, family ties remained
strong throughout slavery, despite legal barriers to stability. Legal
impediments included old conceptualizations of marriage as a contract; since
slaves could not contract, they could not marry.129 Correspondingly, the
incidents of marriage were unenforceable, including the financial
responsibility of fathers to support their children: 130
many whites, believed that slavery had destroyed the sense of
family obligation, was astonished by the eagerness with which
former slaves in contraband camps legalized their marriage bonds.
The same pattern was repeated when the Freedman's Bureau and
state governments made it possible to register and solemnize slave
124. See Table A-2 Employment Status of the Civilian Population by Race, Sex, and Age,
BUREAU LAB. STAT., http://www.bls.gov/news.releaselempsit.t02.htm (last updated Oct. 22, 2013).
125. See U.S. Incarceration Rates by Race and Sex, NAT'L JUST. INST.,
http://www.nij.gov/journals/270/criminal-records-figure2.htm (last updated June 4, 2012).
126. See Maldonado, supra note 3, at 363; Maldonado, Deadbroke, supra note 108, at 993
(stating that men who were never married to their children's mothers are even less likely to be
involved in their children's upbringing or to share a close relationship with them).
127. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2012, TABLE
229 EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT BY RACE AND HISPANIC ORIGIN: 1970 To 2010 (Sept. 30, 2011),
available at http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/cats/education.html.
128. See CASEY E. COPEN ET AL., NAT'L HEALTH STATISTICS REPORTS, FIRST MARRIAGES IN
THE UNITED STATES: DATA FROM THE 2006-2010 NATIONAL SURVEY OF FAMILY GROWTH 1, 5
(2012), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhsr/nhsrO49.pdf.
129. Burnham, supra note 14, at 207-08.
130. Id.
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unions.131
Yet, political leaders in the South worked to eliminate common-law
marriage with the purpose of increasing the number of children deemed
illegitimate, with such effects falling more heavily on Blacks than their
White counterparts. 132 This was at least a part of "the construction of
African-American families as deviant, of African-American women as
sexually available, and White women as untrustworthy with minimal
procreative power remains embedded in the law." 33
Since slaves could not contract, they could not marry; 134 nor were the
incidents of marriage enforceable, including those of support.' 35 Wills, a
quasi-contract establishing rights of inheritance, were not strictly necessary
with a valid marriage. Common-law marriage, dismantled in furtherance of
Black illegitimacy, is only a form of oral contract for marriage. Many lay
people still believe they may engage in enforceable common-law marriage.
VII. CONCLUSION: FINDING SOLUTIONS COUNTERING SLAVERY
A. Mimicking Slave Families: Multi-Party Parenting
This Article began by pointing out the connections between illegitimacy
and slavery1 36 as well as modem welfare and laws 137 intended for the
support of those children deemed illegitimate, which included punishment to
reinforce the stigma of those children and their mothers.138 It seems that the
appropriate remedy for the ills of a system modeled after one created
through the institution of slavery are those means for family and self-
preservation and survival developed during slavery by slaves and former
slaves. Slaves and former slaves routinely cared for the children of relatives
and friends, in the hope that the same was being done for their own children,
wherever they happened to be. 139 Uncertainty and instability generally
131. FONER, supra note 15, at 84.
132. Appleton, supra note 37, at 352.
133. Fellows, Procreative Power, supra note 4, at 521.
134. Bumham, supra note 14, at 207-08.
135. Id.
136. See supra text accompanying notes 8-24.
137. See supra text accompanying notes 26-33.
138. See supra text accompanying notes 69-76 (characterizing "illegitimate" black children
and the mothers who produce them).
139. FONER, supra note 15, at 84. "Many families, in addition, adopted the children of
deceased relatives and friends, rather than see them apprenticed to white masters or placed in
Freedman's Bureau orphanages." Id.
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prompted cooperative efforts from all who could assist in child rearing. That
is to say, legislatures and courts should envision, support and enforce non-
traditional and multiple-party parenting arrangements. 140  Some might
suggest that the routine search by social service administrators for relatives
of a child-needing-placement serves this purpose.141 Use of regulated
contract may also be quite helpful in effective and beneficial formation of
such arrangements. The fact is that multi-party arrangements for child-
rearing are part of a resistance from the past,'4 2 but are also emerging, albeit
slowly and not without difficulty, in the future of family law, child custody
and support matters. 143 After all, parenthood is not only a biological
association, but is also a socially constructed status; the social constructs of
gender and race are of great relevance.
B. Countering Rights-Denials Arising From Slavery: Allowing Regulated
Contract
Denial of contract rights, especially the regulated contracts for
marriage, supported the creation and perpetuation of illegitimacy as a form
140. Aside from the welfare of the child, Fellows suggests reasons based in gender control:
There are two other equally plausible explanations, however, for the dismissal of the
idea of dual paternity. One is that dual paternity destroys the husband's power,
accorded to him through the marital presumption, to prevent the biological father from
interfering in the husband's relationship with his white legitimate child. Moreover, it
would represent a public and legal acknowledgment that a husband had 'lost' control
of his wife to another man.
Fellows, Procreative Power, supra note 4, at 508 (discussing Michael H. and the subsequent
inconsistent case law). In addition, she points out that "dual paternity would have increased the risk
of forced fatherhood outside of marriage. It also would have increased the possibility that a white
man would be thrust into fatherhood of an African-American child." Id. at 509.
141. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON KINSHIP
FOSTER CARE 7-8 (2000), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/kinr2c00/full.pdf. But see Rob Geen,
Kinship Foster Care: An Ongoing, Yet Largely Uninformed Debate, in KINSHIP CARE: MAKING THE
MOST OF A VALUAB3LE RESOURCE I (Rob Geen ed., 2003).
142. See Burnham, supra note 14, at 218.
143. See, e.g., Mae Kuykendal, Liberty in a Divided and Experimental Culture: Respecting
Choice and Enforcing Connection in the American Family, 12 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 251, 259 (2003)
("Today we are familiar with other phenomena informing the notion of family: single mothers,
custodial grandparents, single fathers, surrogacy arrangements and sperm banks, civil unions and
gay marriage, blended families, step families, the lesbian baby boom, stay-at-home fathers, de facto
parents, the ease of divorce, and so on."); Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Reproductive Technology and
Intent-Based Parenthood: an Opportunity for Gender Neutrality, 1990 Wis. L. REv. 297, 345 n. 144
(1990) ("Rather than wholly substituting adoptive for biologic parents, some adoption arrangements
might establish hybrid or extended-family bonds that formally included more than two parents
drawn from combinations of adoptive and biological relationship . . . . In some ways these
arrangements are similar to step-families that arise after divorce. Blended families may include
several de facto fathers or mothers for any given child.").
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of racial subordination. Perhaps appeal to regulated contract 144 could assist
in moving away from this situation. Common law marriage, another
regulated oral contract,145 should be revived for the benefit of children, with
or without the marital presumption. Regulated contract may assist in
workable formal multiparty parenting. Regulated contract is already the
means to facilitate open adoptions. 146 Contract, with regulation, finalizes
family form in the artificial reproductive technologies (ART).147  Quasi-
contract forms, such as defacto parent,148 equitable parent, 149 and parent by
144. Marriage is an agreement between two people, but is only valid if it conforms to the
requirement and regulations of the state. These requirements may be as trivial as the ceremonial
form, see WADLINGTON ET AL., DOMESTIC RELATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 118-21 (7th ed.
2013), or as essential as to whom one may marry, see 50 State Statutory Surveys: Family Law:
Divorce and Dissolution: Grounds for Divorce, 0080 SURVEYS 9 (2007), available at Westlaw.
145. For a valid common law marriage both parties must have capacity, there must be a
contemporaneous agreement to marry, and the couple must hold themselves out to the community as
husband and wife. See, e.g., Ethridge v. Yeager, 465 So.2d 378 (Ala. 1985) ("[T]here must first have
been a present agreement, that is, a mutual understanding to enter at that time into the marriage
relationship . . . . followed by public recognition of the existence of the 'marriage . . . .') (quoting
Skipworth v. Skipworth, 360 So.2d 975, 975 (Ala. 1978)); Stringer v. Stringer, 689 So. 2d 194, 195
(Ala. Civ. App. 1997) ("A valid common-law marriage exists in Alabama when the following
elements are present: 'l) capacity; 2) present, mutual agreement to permanently enter the marriage
relationship to the exclusion of all other relationships; and 3) public recognition of the relationship
as a marriage and public assumption of marital duties and cohabitation."') (quoting Boswell v.
Boswell, 497 So. 2d 479, 480 (Ala. 1986)); Estate of Alcorn, 868 P.2d 629, 631 (Mont. 1994)
(divorce of one party removed impediment to common-law marriage); Most states have abolished
formal recognition of common law marriage, unless it is validly established in another state where
common law marriage is recognized. See 50 State Statutory Surveys: Family Law: Marriage:
Common Law Marriage, 0080 SURVEYS 20 (2012), available at Westlaw. A number of states have
also permitted the filing of an affidavit signed by both parties and notarized, seeking state
recognition of their informal marriage. See id.
146. Only a small number of states will recognize such arrangements. For those that do,
contracts between the relevant parties for visitation and continued parenting are recognized by the
courts to the extent they are not contrary to the best interests of the child. See Annette Ruth Appell,
Reflections on the Movement Toward a More Child-Centered Adoption, 32 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. I
(2010).
147. See, e.g., JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE NEW
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 98-100 (1994) (discussing in vitro fertilization); Naomi Cahn, The
New Kinship, 100 GEO. L.J. 367, 387-91(2012) (discussing the effect of new reproductive
technologies on kinship and families); Darra L. Hofnan, "Mama's Baby, Daddy's Maybe:" A State-
by-State Survey ofSurrogacy Laws and Their Disparate Gender Impact, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
449, 460 (2009).
148. See generally Robin Fretwell Wilson, Trusting Mothers: A Critique of the American Law
Institute's Treatment ofDe Facto Parents, 38 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1103 (2010).
149. See, e.g., Heather Buethe, Note, Second-Parent Adoption and the Equitable Parent
Doctrine: the Future of Custody and Visitation Rights for Same-Sex Partners in Missouri, 20 WASH.
U. J.L. & POL'Y 283 (2006); Sarah Opichka, Note, Custody Cases and the Expansion of the
Equitable Parent Doctrine: When Should "Acting Like" a Parent be Enough?, 19 WIS. WOMEN'S
L.J. 319 (2004).
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estoppel,150 are occasionally used to benefit existing family relationships.
Regulated contract will have its challenges for family governance. Both
rights and responsibilities regarding the child must be clearly delineated to
ensure these needs are met. Yet these are rational means for navigating
conflicts in authority among multiple parties, which may not be any more
burdensome than navigating similar conflicts between two parties.
Reformers must be cognizant of contract's use for racial purposes in the
past. 151 Secrecy in adoption records should not be used to obscure racial
heritage of the child. Secrecy in adoption proceedings and records are still
virtually automatic, making the contracts necessary to effectuate open
adoptions more challenging and often unenforceable. Open adoptions are
most likely to benefit individuals from communities in poverty and
communities of color. Allowing the use of regulated contract in more areas
of family law may make open adoptions more realistic.
ART regulations have substantially followed the marital
presumption. 15 The husband is presumed to be the legal father born into
marriage using ART.15 3 This is, perhaps, unsurprising since most users of
ART are both wealthy and White. 154 It has also been the case, where
surrogacy is legal, that surrogates are excluded from parenting the children
they have gestated by these regulated contracts. This is also unsurprising as
surrogates are often poor and sometimes of color.155
150. See, e.g., Sarah H. Ramsey, Constructing Parenthood for Stepparents: Parents by
Estoppel and De Facto Parents Under The American Law Institute's Principles of the Law of Family
Dissolution, 8 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 285 (2001); Josh Smolow, Note, Can Equitable Estoppel
Be Used as an Effective Way for a Legal Parent to Obtain Child Support for the Children of a
Separated Same-Sex Couple?, 18 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 481 (2012).
151. See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
152. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (holding
that consent by a husband to the artificial donor-insemination of the wife is proof of legal paternity).
153. See id.
154. See Kimberly M. Mutcherson, Transformative Reproduction, 16 J. GENDER RACE & JUST.
187, 201-02 (2013) ("The dominant narrative that emanates from a rights lens is that of a married,
heterosexual couple, usually White, and wealthy, who access technology in response to failed
attempts to have a child through coital means. . . .The dominant narrative of ART exists because the
vast majority of those who use ART in the United States are White and heterosexual, even though
people of color have higher rates of infertility than Whites.").
155. See DOROTHY ROBERTS, THE REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS READER: LAW, MEDICINE, AND
THE CONSTRUCTION OF MOTHERHOOD 308, 312 (Nancy Ehrenreich ed., 2008); Katha Pollitt,
Checkbook Maternity: When Is a Mother Not a Mother?, NATION, Dec. 31, 1990, at 825-42. But
see Erin Nelson, Global Trade And Assisted Reproductive Technologies: Regulatory Challenges in
International Surrogacy, 41 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 240, 247 (2013) ("Contrary to feminist arguments
made in the early days of ARTs, the women who act as surrogates are not poor, uneducated women
of color who comprise some sort of reproductive 'underclass' to serve the needs of wealthy white
women."). Roberts points out that "[b]lack women have, after all, always raised white children
without acquiring any rights to them ... . Now they can breed them, too." Id at 311-12. This racial
and financial imbalance has historical roots in the practice of "wet-nursing." See, e.g., BARBARA L.
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The suggested remedies of exploring multiparty parenting forms in
tandem with more liberal use of contract to benefit children are imperfect.
Unfortunately, the current situation is also imperfect, in part because it is
based in ideas and a history perpetuating an underclass. 56 Although we
may acknowledge the imperfections and challenges, remedies created for
survival and family preservation are at least a step in the right direction.
PHILIPP & SHEINA JEAN-MARIE, AFRICAN AMERICAN WOMEN AND BREASTFEEDING (2007),
available at http://www.jointcenter.org/sites/default/files/upload/research/files/INFANT/
20FINAL%20-%2033%20pages.pdf; Norma Juliet Wikler, Society's Response to the New
Reproductive Technologies: The Feminist Perspectives, 59 S. CAL. L. REv. 1043, 1048 (1986) ("In
the nineteenth century, poor and mostly non-white women acted as wet nurses, selling their milk to
mothers of the upper classes, sometimes depriving their own children in the process.").
156. See generally WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY,
THE UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (2d ed. 2012).
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